Madeleine Bunting 

Do you agree with Steven Pinker – is violence in decline?

Madeleine Bunting: Reading Room: Join me as I read Pinker's new book on the history of violence, and examine some of the claims of this 'astonishing' book
  
  

Normandy Landings
Casualties in the second world war were far less than events such as China's eighth-century An Lushan revolt. Photograph: Hulton Archive/Getty Images Photograph: Hulton Archive/Getty Images

Billed as one of the most important books in recent years, Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes has received rapturous reviews – writing in the Guardian, David Runciman called it "an astonishing book" – but does it deserve all the accolades? Do you agree with his explanation for why violence has declined? And could this decline be reversed? I hope you'll join me in reading the book over the next fortnight, and help me to thrash out the strengths and spot the flaws in the thesis, which Pinker has also set out in today's Guardian.

Pinker argues that we are far less likely to die violently than any previous generation. Even 20th-century atrocities such as the second world war pale into insignificance when death rates as a proportion of the population are compared with events such as China's An Lushan revolt and civil war in the eighth century, which killed 36 million people (the proportional equivalent of 429 million in the mid-20th century).

The book is now sitting on my desk waiting to be read. To be honest, I'm not sure the thesis is much of a surprise to me; I've studied too much history to have any illusions about some golden past of peacefulness. I gather from reviews there is plenty of detail on the human appetite for unspeakable cruelty and sadism – I'm not sure I can stomach much of that.

What strikes me as much more interesting are the causes of this decline. The feminisation of society? The rise of the nation state? Is it the spread of reason and empathy courtesy of the Enlightenment?

That's why the book seemed a good choice to start the Reading Room series, because it is packed with big debates. One of the most contentious is the claim that the decline is in part the outcome of a unique European enlightenment, which extended the scope of human reason. Equally contentious, he seems to suggest that the decline of violence is evidence for a concept of human progress – although Pinker concedes that progress could be fragile and reversible. Whatever else this book is about, it is raising a kind of intellectual standard for liberal humanism at a time when it imagines itself besieged by doubters and critics.

This is what the philosopher John Gray disagrees with and in his review he argued that Pinker was stuck in a contradiction that "afflicts anyone who tries to combine rigorous Darwinism with a belief in moral progress".

There is no doubt that Pinker is on a sort of crusade here and he makes clear his target: "a large swath of our intellectual culture is loath to admit that there could be anything good about civilization, modernity and western society." His response is this massive tome, a counterblast against the pessimism of our age, which is so full of gloom at the possibility of climate wars, global warming and nuclear proliferation.

The reviews on both sides of the Atlantic have lavished praise on Pinker's scholarship. He is a psychologist by background, but this book sees him roaming across many disciplines from international relations to sociology and philosophy. So far reviewers haven't picked him up on any substantial errors in the evidence, so has Pinker got all his homework right?

Back in March, one blogpost questioned an earlier Pinker TED talk on this thesis. It claimed that he had misrepresented rates of violence in hunter-gatherer societies by picking up and extrapolating from data gathered in Papua New Guinea in the mid-70s when the place was well known for high levels of violence and there were already "missionaries, guns and motor boats". It would be dangerous, the blogpost argued, to extrapolate from this period to generalise about the past. So archaeologists and anthropologists might be able to help us out on working through this part of the thesis.

It's a big book and not everyone is going to have time to read it from cover to cover. The Guardian has an excerpt here. Others can be found here and here. Reviews that give you a really detailed sense of the book are Peter Singer's at the New York Times and Runciman's. John Naughton in the Observer did an interesting email interview.

If you want a very skeptical take, John Gray in Prospect makes some characteristically elegant points. Also worth a quick look are the reviews in the Sunday Times and in the Financial Times. And for a very thoughtful discussion of some of the wider implications of this book, look at New York Times columnist Ross Douthat. He raises the question that the decline of violence perhaps more properly should be called the "nationalisation of violence" and that it is linked to the rise of the modern state since the 16th century. He also makes a very good point that Europe's unparalleled peace over the last half century may be the outcome of centuries of civil war, and ethnic and religious conflict; peace has come at a very high price indeed. He came back to the issue in a blogpost and there are some good comments on the thread. He poses the question that several centuries of violence may be required to produce the kind of post-war peace Europe has experienced – and that might be a trajectory for parts of the world where there is currently a lot of conflict, such as parts of Africa. A rather gloomy thesis.

I will be interviewing Steven Pinker tomorrow so post your questions below and come back to watch him on video later this week. In the meantime, this thread will remain open for you to post your ideas about the book, and I'll be joining you regularly as I make my way through it.

• Read the Guardian review of The Better Angels of our Nature here.

Madeleine's comment, 1 November, 6:24pm

Have to say that it's a riveting read. I've been racing through it and he is a brilliant writer. It's the balance of anecdote and analysis which is so well crafted.

So Norbert Elias gets a very generous prominence and much deserved; his analysis of the decline of violence was published in 1939 and languished in obscurity for several decades (terrible timing) but intriguingly he had no statistics to base his analysis on so he turned to medieval paintings and books of etiquette ... What makes Pinker's book so fascinating are all sorts of nuggets of information along the way such as the fact that the rich used to be as violent as the poor but no longer; homicide is now largely a phenomenon amongst lower social economic groups. Or another nugget – most murders are about honour or dignity at root. A slur, adultery rather than the murder as a means to an end.

Many thanks for all the questions for Professor Pinker tomorrow.

I've jotted these down (some slightly paraphrased):


Frustratedartist:
Do you consider that the decrease in violence is a truly global phenomenon, or is it limited to the 'developed' or 'prosperous' world? To what extent is it dependent on political social or economic 'systems', and how fragile do you think those systems are?

Alexayr: Percentages can be misleading. Could absolute numbers not also have been factored in Better Angels?

DavidPavett: So, to repeat, just what is the significance for us of the proposition that the world is becoming more/less violent?

Brymor: Does the behaviour of the media tend to reduce violence, or increase it?

Selfpropelled: I'd also like to ask Prof. Pinker for his response to the criticism that his conclusions rest on an extremely fragile state of affairs, and that over the course of the next few generations, he could be proved wrong.

Catch22: Does Pinker define violence as purely physical violence against another person? What about structural violence? Systems of coercion that are legal-bureaucratic but that still produce compliance and are deigned to control populations and make people do what they otherwise might not/would not do?

How does he deal with the idea that as professional armies increased and technology continued to advance the practice of violence in the form of warfare has became more expensive – when you tie this in with Tilly's thesis on the role of war-making in state making and the growth of taxation/representation relations in states – it all seems really problematic.

 

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